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Procyclicality of ﬁ  nancial systems:




Toulouse School of Economics
Financial systems have an intrinsic tendency to exacerbate business cycle ﬂ  uctuations rather than smoothing 
them out. The current crisis is a perfect illustration of this. Some commentators have argued that the recent 
reforms to international bank regulation (Basel II) and accounting rules (IAS 39) are likely to increase
this intrinsic procyclicality in the future. This article examines whether this accusation is founded and what 
policy decisions could be envisaged to alleviate this undesirable feature of ﬁ  nancial systems.ARTICLES
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THE INTRINSIC PROCYCLICALITY
OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
The subprime crisis is a perfect illustration of the 
“procyclicality” of ﬁ   nancial systems. Relatively 
small losses1 on US credit markets in the early 
summer 2007 have precipitated a major, world-wide
conﬁ   dence crisis in the banking and ﬁ  nancial 
sectors, thereby reducing dramatically the capacity 
of these sectors to provide ﬁ  nancing to households 
and ﬁ  rms, by far the most important function of 
ﬁ  nancial systems. This phenomenon is by no means 
speciﬁ  c to the current crisis. Financial history2 
abounds with examples of such ﬁ  nancial cycles, with 
an alternation of credit booms fuelled by “exuberant” 
optimism during growth phases, followed by dramatic 
episodes of credit “crunches” triggered by relatively 
moderate negative shocks but ultimately generating 
major downturns in economic activity.
In an hypothetical world of perfect (i.e. complete and 
frictionless) ﬁ  nancial markets, this should not be the 
case. On the contrary, ﬁ  nancial instruments should 
in theory be available to insure the real shocks faced 
by households and ﬁ  rms. For example all the risks 
confronted by individual economic agents (risks that 
economists call “idiosyncratic”) should be eliminated 
by diversiﬁ  cation. Similarly, macroeconomic shocks 
should be dampened by ﬁ  nancial systems, through 
an efﬁ  cient reallocation of risks among economic 
agents and a better diversiﬁ  cation across countries 
and generations.
In practice however, ﬁ  nancial markets are inevitably 
imperfect.3 First of all they cannot be complete: many 
of the individual risks confronted by households and 
ﬁ  rms are not insurable, because of informational 
problems that are susceptible of provoking 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Similarly
inter-temporal transfer of risks is necessarily 
limited by the unavailability (or at best illiquidity)
of ﬁ  nancial instruments with long maturities. Second, 
ﬁ  nancial markets cannot either be considered as 
frictionless: direct and indirect transaction costs 
are not negligible, especially on primary markets. 
A good illustration of these frictions is the difﬁ  culty 
typically confronted by a ﬁ  nancially distressed ﬁ  rm 
when it wants to issue new securities. In fact, it is 
often the case that liquidity problems encountered by 
a ﬁ  rm, even if it is proﬁ  table and solvent, degenerate 
into fundamental difﬁ  culties such as credit rationing 
and sometimes inefﬁ  cient closure. 
These imperfections of ﬁ   nancial markets can 
be alleviated by two mechanisms: ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation and public policy. The modern 
role of ﬁ  nancial  intermediaries4 such as banks 
and insurance companies is indeed to decrease 
the transaction costs associated with complex 
ﬁ  nancial instruments and provide indirect access 
to these instruments for ﬁ  rms (mostly small and 
medium enterprises) and households. The larger 
ﬁ   rms, which typically use direct ﬁ  nance,  also 
beneﬁ  t from ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, since these 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries contribute to improving the 
functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets. In particular they 
provide certiﬁ  cation services for primary markets 
and increase the liquidity of secondary markets by 
taking large trading positions that contribute to the 
elimination of arbitrage opportunities. 
Public policy also plays an important role in the 
reduction of economic and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  uctuations. 
Given their unique ability to pledge the income of 
future generations (through taxation), governments 
can adopt anti-cyclical ﬁ  scal and budgetary policies that 
might contribute to dampen economic ﬂ  uctuations. 
Monetary policy can be also used as a stabilizer: in some 
countries such as the United States, the mandate of the
central bank includes, together with the standard 
objective of price stability, that of maintaining 
maximum sustainable employment.5 Finally, public 
authorities are supposed to maintain the safety and 
soundness of the ﬁ  nancial systems, through appropriate 
prudential regulation and supervision of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries. But these regulatory/supervisory 
systems may themselves generate procyclicality. This 
is the topic we examine in the next section.
1  See Brunnermeier (2008).
2  See Kindleberger (2000).
3  We only consider here the two major forms of imperfections, namely incompleteness and the presence of transaction costs. We do not discuss here another form 
of ﬁ  nancial markets imperfection, coming from the fact that the market value of ﬁ  nancial assets may sometimes differ substantially from their “fundamental” 
value (even though this fundamental value is often very difﬁ  cult to deﬁ  ne objectively), creating “bubbles” (when the market value exceeds the fundamental value)
or underpricing (in the reverse situation). These divergences create an important drawback in the use of market value accounting for ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Mishkin (2008) discusses the implications of bubbles for monetary policy.
4  The traditional role of banks was to transform the savings of households (mostly in the form of demandable deposits) into corporate and real estate loans.
The development of ﬁ  nancial markets and techniques (notably securitisation) has largely made this business model obsolete.
5  See Mishkin (2008).ARTICLES
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IS PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE
OF PROCYCLICALITY?
The prudential regulation of banks has two main 
objectives: protect the deposits of the public and 
guarantee the stability of the ﬁ  nancial  system. 
Since the 1980s, the international harmonisation of 
prudential systems has been a constant preoccupation 
of the public authorities of developed countries. 
In this spirit, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) has successively produced
two sets of regulatory standards (1988, 2004), 
nicknamed Basel I and Basel II, that were initially 
intended to apply to internationally active banks 
of G10 countries. In several regions of the world, 
these standards have also been adopted by domestic 
regulators, albeit with some adjustments. 
The main component of these standards is a 
minimum capital requirement: roughly speaking, 
the ratio of a commercial bank’s own funds over 
a weighted sum of its assets (risk-weighted assets 
or RWA) should be at least 8%. Effectively, this 
requirement limits the maximum volume of risky 
assets that a commercial bank can manage (including 
in particular the volume of loans it can grant) to a 
certain multiple (the inverse of the minimum capital 
ratio, namely 12.5) of its equity capital. The main 
difference between Basel I and Basel II resides in the 
weights used for the computation of RWA.
The ofﬁ  cial justiﬁ  cation for such capital requirements 
is that they provide a buffer against losses that 
limits the probability of failure of the bank 
over a certain horizon to some predetermined 
threshold: this is the value-at-risk (VaR) approach
to solvency regulations. Without commenting in detail 
about the arbitrariness of this criterion of a maximal 
probability of failure for banks, as well as recalling 
the major drawbacks of the VaR criterion,6 it seems 
reasonable to consider instead that the objective 
of these capital requirements is rather to preserve 
banks’ incentives to select carefully their assets and to 
monitor their borrowers, very much in the same way 
that banks themselves impose a maximum borrowing 
capacity to their corporate borrowers.
In any case, capital requirements are intrinsically 
procyclical: banks incur more credit losses during 
recessions than during booms, which negatively 
impacts their own funds (the numerator of 
the capital ratio decreases) and therefore their 
maximum lending capacities also decreases. 
Thus Basel I was already potentially procyclical:
in effect it was indeed accused of provoking a credit 
crunch in the early 1990s. But of course Basel II 
is likely to be much more procyclical, since RWA, 
the denominator of the capital ratio, will increase 
during downturns, simultaneously to the decrease 
in the numerator already mentioned. As explained 
by Taylor and Goodhart (2004), this is due to the 
fact that Basel II risk weights incorporate different 
measures of credit risk (such as the probability
of default, PD and the loss given default, LGD) 
that increase during recessions. Thus the capital 
required for a given volume of loans is likely to 
increase during recessions. Several empirical studies 
validate this presumption. For example Kashyap 
and Stein (2003) ﬁ  nd that three different methods 
proposed by the BCBS to compute credit risk weights
(Standard and Poor’s credit ratings, Moody’s KMV 
model and a major international bank’s internal credit 
risk model) all lead to signiﬁ  cant increases in capital 
requirements. However, the precise way in which 
capital charges are computed also plays a big role. 
For example Saurina and Trucharte (2006) show that 
the method used to compute the PD: instantaneously 
(point in time), versus dynamically (through the 
cycle) has a dramatic impact on the procyclicality 
of the capital ratio. A dynamic computation method 
smooths out capital requirements, at the cost of 
reducing the informational content of capital ratios.7 
The same is true for the computation of provisions 
for credit losses.8
However, most banks hold actually much more capital 
than the regulatory minimum. This discrepancy 
between “economic” capital and regulatory capital is 
due to the fact that banks are also subject to market 
discipline: shareholders, ﬁ  nancial analysts and rating 
agencies typically require higher capital buffers than 
regulators. Besides, bank managers often adopt a 
sound, prospective approach: they hold capital in 
6  Alfred Galichon (2008, personal communication) has found a devastating critique: any portfolio of risks can be sliced in a conveniently designed family
of sub-portfolios in such way that the total VaR (at some predetermined conﬁ  dence level) is exactly zero!
7  See Gordy and Howells (2004).
8  See Bikker and Metzemakers (2002).ARTICLES
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excess of regulatory minimums, in order to cover 
losses due to predictable economic downturns.
In other words, additional capital buffers should 
allow banks to maintain a reasonable volume of 
lending activities even during recessions. This is the 
point of view defended by Jaime Caruana, the former 
Chairman of the BCBS: “When banking systems are 
adequately capitalised, well-managed and risks 
are correctly assessed within the appropriate time 
horizon, the ﬁ  nancial system becomes more stable, 
less procyclical, better able to promote sustainable 
growth, and more resilient during periods
of stress”.9
 
Thus, even though there is indeed some 
procyclicality in the minimum capital ratio 
imposed to banks by Basel II, it is not clear that 
it will impact dramatically the volume of credit 
to the economy, given that banks can potentially 
smooth out the ﬂ  uctuations of the regulatory ratio 
through their economic capital buffer. Moreover, 
Basel II accords also include two other “pillars”: 
regulatory action and market discipline. The 
former (pillar 2) can mitigate the procyclical effects
of the capital ratio (pillar 1) if regulators can impose 
additional capital charges to the banks that would hold 
insufﬁ  cient economic capital. The latter (pillar 3)
may have more ambiguous effects, given that more 
transparency is often synonymous of more volatility. 
This is also the case for IAS 39, the new International 
Accounting Standard that imposes market value 
accounting for ﬁ  nancial derivatives and for the 
assets that are part of the banks’ trading books.
Many commentators have pointed out the risks 
of market value accounting especially during 
periods of crisis. For example Plantin, Sapra
and Shin (2008) show that when assets sales by 
ﬁ   nancial intermediaries are forced by binding 
liquidity or leverage constraints, the changes in 
the market price of these assets do not reﬂ  ect any 
new information about fundamentals, but rather 
the variations in the aggregate liquidity of the 
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms that are susceptible of purchasing 
these assets: this is what Allen and Carletti (2008) 
call “liquidity pricing”. In this context, fair value 
accounting performs badly, especially if assets are 
long-lived, illiquid and senior, which are precisely 
the characteristics of the majority of banks’ assets.
9  See Caruana (2004).
Even though Basel II and IAS 39 will introduce some additional procyclicality in the minimum capital 
requirements of banks, it is not clear that the impact on bank lending will ultimately be sizable: this remains 
to be established by facts rather than presumptions. Moreover, even in the case where this additional 
procyclicality is indeed conﬁ  rmed by empirical studies, it would be a big mistake to compensate it through 
regulatory forbearance, i.e. making target capital ratios (8% at present) contracyclical. The impact on 
banks’ incentives would be a disaster, especially in the present context where public authorities have 
already intervened a lot, in order to protect private institutions from closure. As we already pointed out,
if governments want to smooth out economic ﬂ  uctuations, they should use appropriate policy instruments 
such as ﬁ  scal and possibly monetary policy, and should not interfere with prudential regulation and 
supervision of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. 
This being said, it is important for prudential authorities to continue their efforts in trying to eliminate 
the possibilities of regulatory arbitrage that are offered by current regulatory arrangements. Similarly,
rather than refusing the additional transparency provided by fair value accounting, regulators should 
develop new methods to “ﬁ  lter out” spurious components of market prices that do not reﬂ  ect changes 
in the fundamental values of assets. This can only be done properly prudential authorities endeavour to 
clarify, and possibly express in quantitative terms, what are the exact objectives of prudential regulation 
and what are the appropriate benchmarks and measurement tools (asset valuation, provisioning,
capital requirements,..) that must be chosen in order to implement these objectives.ARTICLES
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